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Abstract
South Korea hopes to become a major exporter of nuclear 
plants. Its success in building up its domestic nuclear industry, 
winning a $20.4 billion contract to build four nuclear power 
plants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), building Jordan’s first 
research reactor, and providing training programs and best 
practices to nuclear newcomer states indicates that established 
vendors should take this determination seriously. If South 
Korea draws the right lessons from its experience with the UAE 
and builds upon its competitive advantages in the international 
nuclear energy market—low cost, high credibility, high 
performance, strong political backing, attractive financing, and 
U.S technology at a low cost—it could record similar success in 
the future. 
Introduction
South Korea hopes to become a major exporter of nuclear 
plants. Fresh off winning a highly competitive $20.4 billion 
contract to build four nuclear power plants in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), building Jordan’s first research reactor, and 
providing training programs as well as sharing best practices 
with nuclear newcomer states, the ROK in 2010 announced 
that it would seek to export 80 nuclear reactors by 2030.1 
Subsequently, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, 
the global financial crisis, and the limitations of South Korea’s 
nuclear industry have forced the ROK to scale back these 
ambitious objectives. Nonetheless, South Korea remains intent 
on securing additional global reactor contracts in countries 
such as India, Vietnam, Poland, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, 
as well as bigger markets such as China and the United States. 
If South Korea draws the right lessons from its experience with 
the UAE and builds upon its competitive advantages in the 
international nuclear energy market, it could record similar 
success in the future. 
Nuclear Deals
The UAE selected in 2009 a consortium led by Korea Electric 
Power Corporation (KEPCO), a South Korean government-owned 
electric utility, for a contract to design and construct four APR-
1400s in Barakah. The APR-1400 design is an advanced version 
of the Combustion Engineering (now Westinghouse) System 
80+. Shin-Kori Units 3 and 4, currently under construction in 
Korea, will serve as the “reference NPPs” for Barakah 1 and 2. 
Jordan has been collaborating with South Korea on building 
Jordan’s first research reactor and training Jordanian personnel. 
In March 2010, Amman signed a $130 million agreement with 
South Korea to supply Jordan’s first nuclear research reactor. The 
Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and Daewoo 
would construct the reactor at the Jordan University of Science 
and Technology (JUST). The reactor is expected to be online 
and operational by 2015. Jordan will receive 3.5 years’ worth 
of fuel supply from South Korea and is looking to either secure 
additional nuclear fuel from various international vendors or use 
fuel from Jordanian uranium enriched abroad.2 South Korea has 
agreed to finance most of the project, providing a $70 million 
soft loan, which includes a feasibility study on environmental 
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impact. The ROK also plans to establish a nuclear training and 
technology center at JUST where Jordanian nuclear engineers 
and technicians would be trained by South Korean experts.3 
South Korea is also considered a leader in nuclear energy 
training and human development. KEPCO International Nuclear 
Graduate School (KINGS), established in 2012 by KEPCO in 
cooperation with George Mason University, plans to enroll 
foreigners as half of its student body, stating, “Raising talents 
from potential export countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Vietnam 
and Indonesia will produce valuable networks we need in the 
future.”4 The 62 students accepted in 2013 came from fifteen 
countries.5 Additionally, South Korean companies and agencies 
such as KAERI, KINS, Korea Nuclear International Cooperation 
Foundation (KONICOF), and Korea International Cooperation 
Agency provide training for nuclear newcomers. 
Of the two deals South Korea secured so far, the UAE deal is far 
more significant in terms of its financial impact, as a symbol of 
South Korea’s emergence as a global nuclear player, and the 
precedent it sets for other potential nuclear deals. As such, it is 
worth examining the factors that led to the UAE contract. 
Why the ROK Won the UAE Deal and Lessons for  
the Future 
The ROK’s successful bid for the UAE contract can be ascribed 
to political, technical, business, financial, and cultural factors. 
Political Factors
The nuclear deal was not the first large contract the ROK won 
in the UAE. The countries have been cooperating in strategic 
sectors, including oil production, finance, and health care. 
The close ties Korea has cultivated with the UAE in trade and 
infrastructure projects were of great importance in winning the 
bid. The UAE is the second-largest oil and natural gas exporter 
to Korea, and the Emirates have become South Korea’s largest 
export market in the Middle East.6
Moreover, the Korean government was adept at using various 
policy channels to support the Korean consortium, including 
leadership at the highest levels, including then-Korean President 
Lee Myung-bak. That Lee was the former CEO of Hyundai 
Engineering and Construction, a central actor in the Korean 
consortium, added credibility to the diplomatic exchanges and 
the Korean bid. 
I t 
i s 
also not uncommon to add diplomatic “carrots” to a nuclear bid 
to make it more attractive. In the South Korea case, in addition 
to the nuclear deal, the countries also agreed to cooperate 
on renewable energy, education, shipbuilding, information 
communications technology and human resource development, 
as well as the strategic storage of six million barrels of Abu 
Dhabi oil in Korea. As part of the military cooperation, the 
ROK military committed to provide two years of special forces 
training to its UAE counterparts. The two countries will also 
hold joint military exercises and exchange defense industry 
technology and high-ranking military officials.7
South Korea’s close relationship with the United States and 
Westinghouse’s participation in the Korean consortium also 
played a key role. The UAE appreciated the fact that the South 
Korean nuclear design is of U.S. origin and Westinghouse would 
be involved in the project, making it difficult for the United 
States, its primary security benefactor, to object to the deal.8
Technical Factors 
With 23 nuclear reactors in operation, KEPCO is renowned 
for having the highest “capacity factor”—the proportion of 
time that the reactor is generating electricity—and the lowest 
“unplanned shutdown” rate in the world, at only 0.3-0.5 times 
per month compared to 3.2 times per month in France (based 
on South Korean reports).9 
South Korea also appealed to the UAE’s desire to initiate and 
complete the project quickly, which not only shortens the time 
until electricity would be available but also reduces construction 
and financing costs—the primary cost-drivers in nuclear energy 
production.10 Korean companies have proved themselves able 
to build nuclear power reactors in a relatively short time and 
follow a predictable schedule. South Korean engineers have 
“Of the two deals South Korea secured 
so far, the UAE deal is far more 
significant in terms of its financial 
impact, as a symbol of South Korea’s 
emergence as a global nuclear player, 




developed methods to speed up construction through the use 
of special quick-drying, high-quality concrete and management 
techniques that allow tasks to be performed simultaneously.11 
The overseas capacity of Korea’s nuclear industry will 
undoubtedly be judged based on its performance in the UAE, 
its first project outside of South Korea. While the APR-1400 is 
a new reactor that has not yet been completed in Korea and 
will have to be modified in order to comply with the regulatory 
and geographic specificities of the UAE, so far construction 
is on schedule, or even ahead of schedule, and Korea seems 
confident it will complete the project before the deadline.12
Business Model 
KEPCO and its core group of subcontractors (see Figure 1) have 
worked together for years on the domestic Korean nuclear 
power program using a model similar to the one that the UAE 
is planning to implement. These factors compared favorably 
with the lack of coordination between Areva and EDF, EDF’s 
late inclusion into the bid, the high cost of EPR technology, and 
the fact that Areva planned to outsource some aspects of the 
reactor construction.13
In addition, while in the initial French bid construction and 
operation risks were divided between Areva, TOTAL and GDF-
SUEZ, in the Korean consortium all these risks are borne 
by KEPCO. This risk allocation puts responsibility on one 
organization, it reduces the litigation risks in case of delays or 
performance problems and increases the incentives for the 
contractor to meet the project delivery objectives.
As a nuclear newcomer, the UAE was looking for a supplier 
that would be willing and able to support local personnel 
development with extensive training, human resources 
development and education.15 According to the UAE, one of the 
main criteria in awarding the contract to South Korea was the 
ROK’s “commitment and detailed planning for human resource 
development in the UAE in support of the development of a 
sustainable, domestically-sourced nuclear energy workforce 
that is dominated by competent national talent.”16 The ROK has 
also been assisting the UAE with upgrading its quality assurance 
standards and capabilities as well as training Emiratis both in 
the UAE and in South Korea. 
Financial Factors
As part of the Korean deal, the Korean government attached 
a letter of intent to the agreement to finance the project. 
The financing package includes investments, direct loans and 
external debt guarantees for the special purpose vehicle as well 
as preferred loans for domestic suppliers.17 The 23-year deal 
carries very low interest rates of 1.75 percent to 2.6 percent, 
with full government guarantees on the various project risks.18 
KEPCO’s profit is intended to come out of the payment for 
the construction of the nuclear plant, a 60-year contract 
for equipment replacements and potential equity interest. 
Additional follow-on contracts for long-term operation and 
maintenance of the Barakah plant, worth as much as another 
$20 billion over 60 years, are being discussed with KEPCO and 
other vendors. Moreover, while the UAE has not declared 
publicly that it will standardize its nuclear reactor design and 
choose ROK as the supplier of future reactors, a senior UAE 
official indicated that this would be the case.19 
The ROK has relatively low execution costs, a distinct competitive 
advantage. The APR-1400s built in South Korea are the most 
inexpensive nuclear reactors in the world (the overnight cost20 is 
about 60 percent lower than that of the EPR in France and that of 
the AP1000 in China).21 It is estimated that even after taking into 
account the 10 percent cost of capital and the various adaptations 
of the reactor design to fit the UAE unique circumstances, the 
cost of the UAE APR-1400 came in only about 30 to 40 percent 
above the declared cost of the APR-1400 under construction in 
Korea—still a very attractive price.22 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the price tag of the South 
Korean bid was significantly lower than that of the other 
bids. While it is unknown what the final bid was for each of 
the proposals, it was reported that the South Korean price 
was unmatched.23 The Korean low price was in fact criticized 
within South Korea, with the opposition party claiming it was 
Figure 1: KEPCO Consortium14
Reactor Race: South Korea’s Nuclear Export Successes and Challenges
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
4
commercially unviable and that future buyers would expect 
similar terms.24
Cultural Factors
At least from the South Korean side, there is a feeling that 
the two countries have similar historical backgrounds: both 
have experienced a colonial period, both are newly developed 
countries with “similar value systems,” and both have a concern 
for the preservation of traditional “ethics and manners.”25 The 
UAE leadership appreciated the fact that KEPCO formed a “war 
room” in the second basement of its Seoul headquarters in 
which 75-80 executives from the consortium coordinated the 
proposal and sales push for more than seven months.26
Future Export Possibilities 
How well will these advantages translate into other ROK 
nuclear exports? Recently South Korean nuclear insiders have 
acknowledged that the worldwide decline in nuclear reactor 
demand after the Fukushima disaster and the global financial 
crisis, as well as shortages of qualified personnel, mean a more 
realistic expectation for South Korea to export ten nuclear 
plants (which can contain several reactors) by 2030. 
South Korea’s nuclear reactor exports will be shaped by the 
broad pull of global nuclear demand, the demand of individual 
potential customers, and how well South Korea stacks up 
against competitors in meeting those demands. According 
to the IAEA, 68 reactors are currently under construction in 
thirteen countries.27 Of the seventeen reactors commissioned 
over the past five years, twelve are located in Asia.28 
Most nuclear plant customers choose to buy their plants 
based on their political relationship with the supplier and 
the economic criteria of reactor price (including financing), 
scheduling, and quality. In the future, the key question for 
South Korea is whether it will be able to meet these criteria 
for future customers in the same way it did for the UAE in 
the 2009 deal. For the economic criteria, two particular areas 
of importance will be financing and the availability of key 
resources needed to meet cost, scheduling, and quality goals. 
On the political side, Seoul’s ability to maintain and improve 
relations with the United States and with certain regional 
players is likely to prove essential. 
Reactor Price, Financing, and ROK Profit Margin. South Korean 
nuclear insiders have said that the ROK does not expect to offer 
as generous prices, and especially financing, to future customers 
as it did to the UAE, with one terming the UAE deal “the golden 
case that will not happen again.” Yet, other customers are likely 
to seek to pay similar prices as the UAE deal, potentially placing 
the ROK in a difficult position given the limits of its financial 
resources. A build-own-operate (“BOO”) model would be even 
riskier for Korea than the UAE financial conditions, and this 
kind of business scheme has no proven record of success in the 
nuclear sector. So far, only Russia has made such an attempt, 
building four nuclear reactors in Turkey, but the arrangement 
was pushed by the Russian government as part of a broader 
energy cooperation agreement. Rosatom, as the implementer of 
the project, is a reluctant participant, doubting the project could 
prove profitable. 
Resource Availability: Personnel. Another concern that could 
prove an obstacle in future ROK export deals is a shortage of 
sufficient Korean personnel given the number of domestic 
reactors under construction and the need to staff the UAE plant. 
It is estimated that KHNP alone will involve 415 to 1,798 people 
in the UAE nuclear project between 2012 and 2020.29 According 
to Park Goon-cherl, president of KINGS, “Korea is running far 
short of high-skilled manpower for industrial use of nuclear 
energy.”30 For future bids, the ROK would need to enhance its 
personnel and likely need to partner with personnel from other 
countries including Japan and the United States. 
A crucial question will be the degree to which South Korean 
exports will have to compete for personnel, financial, and 
manufacturing resources with the construction of domestic 
plants. Previously, South Korea planned to increase the nuclear 
share of electricity generation to 59 percent by 2030. For this 
purpose, five nuclear units are currently under construction 
and four more units are planned to be completed between 
2018 and 2021.31 According to industry experts, the new 
government of President Park Geun-hye is unlikely to seek to 
initiate the construction of additional nuclear power plants as 
the presidential transition team prioritized ensuring nuclear 
power plant safety. If the new administration decides to hold 
off on initiating further construction of domestic nuclear plants 
this could free resources for exports. 
Safety. Following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, South 
Korea hosted safety reviews by both domestic authorities 
and the IAEA at all of its operating reactors. As a result, the 
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government has pledged an investment of $1 billion over the 
next five years to further bolster nuclear safety.32 Nonetheless, 
South Korea’s nuclear energy program has recently come under 
scrutiny after several safety scandals, such as the discovery of 
microscopic cracks in tunnels that guide control fuel rods and 
forgery by eight companies of 60 quality and safety certificates 
for 7,000 parts of “non-core” components used in two reactors 
between 2003 and 2012.33 During 2012 the country’s nuclear 
reactors experienced temporary unplanned shutdowns more 
than fifteen times and in December 2012, due to maintenance, 
other glitches and the fraud investigation, seven of South Korea’s 
23 nuclear reactors were closed, and the heads of KEPCO and 
KHNP resigned.34 While Emirati officials assessed that the UAE’s 
nuclear plants are “unlikely to be affected by the safety issues 
dogging Korean reactors,” safety, ethic, and organizational 
culture problems will certainly have to be seriously addressed 
by the South Koreans to reassure potential future clients.35
Political Factor—the US link. As noted above, the ROK’s 
links to the United States, both politically and commercially 
were important to winning the UAE deal. The connection to 
Westinghouse provided a testament to the quality of ROK 
reactors for the UAE which took a risk in becoming the first 
buyer of the ROK’s nuclear power plant exports. Politically, 
the U.S. connection allowed the UAE to avoid offending its 
primary security benefactor and provide a U.S. company with 
a piece of the economic pie.36 This indicates that the ROK may 
have a better shot at winning deals in those countries that 
enjoy similar strategic relationships with the United States 
such as Saudi Arabia. This is particularly important for the 
ROK because its major competitors have a more global reach 
and can offer greater security or other “carrots” while South 
Korea is considered a “middle power” in global terms. 
At the same time, however, it leaves South Korea vulnerable 
to any disruption in the U.S.-ROK nuclear relationship. In April, 
South Korea skirted but didn’t eliminate this threat when it 
agreed to a two-year extension of the current bilateral civil 
nuclear agreement which had been set to expire in March 
2014.37 Assuming that the agreement is approved by the two 
countries legislatures, it means the countries will have two 
more years to try again to reach agreement on a new nuclear 
cooperation agreement. 
The decision to extend the agreement is very important to 
South Korea’s ability to cut export deals over the next three 
years. In addition, a failure to reach an agreement could have 
had major implications for both the South Korean and U.S. 
nuclear industries: South Korea is dependent on U.S. nuclear 
material and technology while many U.S. reactors are built with 
Korean components. An inability to reach an agreement could 
also have been perceived as a major blow to the alliance. 
The key stumbling block in the talks has been South Korea’s 
desire that the U.S grant advanced consent to enrich and 
reprocess (pyroprocess)38 “U.S. origin” nuclear fuel. U.S. 
law since the late 1970s has sought to discourage nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) non-nuclear-weapon states 
like South Korea from engaging in such “alteration in form or 
content,” which can produce fissile material (enriched uranium 
or plutonium) that can be used either in nuclear weapons or 
civil nuclear fuel. 
Leaving aside the domestic justifications ROK mentioned for 
reprocessing and enrichment,39 one factor some South Korean 
technical specialists offer for the program is their belief that 
if the country adopted pyroprocessing for handling its own 
nuclear fuel it could then supply the reprocessing service 
to other countries, bolstering its reactor exports or at least 
enabling KEPCO to avoid the deep discounting that it was 
forced to offer in the UAE. Such a service, however, is unlikely 
to be viewed by ROK politicians as politically viable. It is Seoul’s 
difficulties in finding appropriate locations to store or dispose 
of its own spent fuel which have generated some of the ROK’s 
interest in pyroprocessing. This political opposition is likely to 
be even higher in highly nationalist South Korea when it comes 
to accepting foreign spent fuel for reprocessing. And the service 
is only likely to prove attractive to other countries, however, 
if South Korea was willing to accept the high-level waste that 
would remain after pyroprocessing—a political non-starter in 
the ROK.40 
Some ROK officials are also interested in enrichment as a 
nuclear export component to reap both direct profits from 
selling enrichment services and perceived additional profits 
from being able to offer more of a “full-service” package when 
it sells nuclear reactors.41 Notwithstanding whatever domestic 
benefits Korea would reap from such an enrichment capability, 
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South Korean investments in a domestic nuclear enrichment 
capability make little commercial sense. South Korea would 
likely find it difficult to compete with established enrichment 
suppliers who can add additional centrifuges at a much lower 
cost than building whole new facilities with indigenous ROK 
technology (Japan has struggled for years to build a domestic 
enrichment capacity). Nor have the existing suppliers expressed 
a willingness to transfer technologies to the ROK, even if they 
could maintain control. In addition, outside of some former 
Soviet clients who initially had little choice but to buy all front-
end services bundled together —uranium mining, conversion, 
enrichment, and fuel fabrication— utilities prefer to strike 
separate deals for each service in order to obtain the best price. 
Not to mention the global enrichment market is a much smaller 
market in any case than the nuclear reactor market.42
While the extension decision does not solve the fundamental 
disagreements between the two countries on pyroprocessing 
and enrichment, it does buy time. Negotiations are reported 
to resume as early as June. Yet, even under a successful 
negotiation of a new agreement, South Korea is still likely to 
chafe at some elements of U.S involvement. In particular, the 
U.S. government is still likely to have a stronger say over ROK 
nuclear power plant exports than some ROK proponents of 
“nuclear sovereignty” may like. 
KEPCO formed a consortium with Westinghouse and its 
Japanese partner Toshiba Power Systems because there are 
technologies that South Korea has not mastered and some 
technologies that are patented by those companies. The 
inclusion of U.S. components and technology in the plants and 
the fact that commercial-scale light-water reactors (i.e., APR-
1400) Korea plans to exports are based on a Westinghouse 
design means that U.S. approval is required for such re-export 
under sections 123 and 131 of the Atomic Energy Act.43 In 
addition, Westinghouse would likely need to seek Part 810 
Authorization (named after the relevant section of the U.S. 
code) from the U.S. Department of Energy and other U.S. 
agencies before it and its employees can conduct nuclear-
related business abroad. 
The re-export of major U.S.-origin nuclear reactor components 
may also require the ratification of a nuclear cooperation 
agreement between the U.S. and the importing country. Such 
a requirement may prove a challenge, at least with regard to 
new nuclear aspirants, until the U.S. decides whether to include 
obligations to forgo enrichment and reprocessing in future nuclear 
cooperation agreements. It would also prove problematic for 
ROK future nuclear export if the U.S.-ROK cooperation agreement 
was to expire. Any uncertainty and potential delay as a result of 
an expired nuclear cooperation agreement would undoubtedly 
be a major source of concern to future Korean customers. 
Conclusions
Analyzing the reasons that the UAE has chosen South Korea 
as a supplier for the first four nuclear units highlights several 
advantages the ROK enjoys. First, South Korea has developed 
a distinct competitive advantage in terms of low cost, high 
credibility, and high performance. Second, South Korea 
sacrificed some of its potential profit margin to pass on its low 
costs to the customer and make the deal happen. In addition, it 
has benefited from strong political support from its government 
and president, and the deal included attractive financing. Third, 
South Korea provided U.S technology at a low cost and closely 
cooperated with Westinghouse, preventing any rupture in the 
UAE’s relations with its key security benefactor. 
So far, South Korea has signed nuclear cooperation agreements 
with 27 states.44 But based on South Korea’s competitive 
advantages, it is fair to conclude that its most likely prospects, 
with the lowest risk factors, are in the Middle East—with lesser 
possibilities in Southeast Asia, South Africa, and even the United 
States (if it secures U.S. license approval for the APR-1400). 
As the UAE experience shows, the Middle East looms as a 
particularly attractive market for South Korea. Like the UAE, 
several other countries in the region are faced with growing 
electricity demand and want to limit the potential economic and 
environmental costs of using fossil fuel for power generation, 
and are engaged in, or seriously considering, the development 
of civil nuclear power. In the Middle East, the main nuclear 
energy program after the UAE’s will be Saudi Arabia, with 
plans to generate 17.6GW of power progressively by 2032. In 
December 2011, the Saudi government announced it would 
invest more than $100 billion in the construction of sixteen 
nuclear power plants.45 Even if only some of these investments 
materialize, Riyadh is clearly looking at an ambitious program 
where financing will not be a decisive factor and is a country 
where U.S. ties could prove helpful. 
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In addition, the ROK has proven experience and prominence in 
running and operating mega projects in this region, especially 
in the energy sector. Korean construction companies have 
played a leading role in new infrastructure—including 
quality assurance, desalination and grid upgrades—in many 
Middle Eastern states. Indeed, in 2012 South Korean firms 
dominated six of the top ten EPC Middle Eastern oil, gas, and 
petrochemicals contracts, and Doosan is leading numerous 
thermal water desalination projects in the region.46 The fact 
that South Korea understands and operates successfully in 
Middle Eastern cultures is a great asset and much appreciated 
by most governments in the region. This could work to South 
Korea’s advantage in securing future nuclear deals. 
The experience South Korea will gain from adapting its APR-
1400 to the specific security and geographic characteristics of 
the UAE,47 as well as providing training, quality assurance and 
grid upgrade support, will provide South Korea with another 
competitive advantage over potential competitors. This will 
further strengthen South Korea’s existing advantages such as 
low cost, high credibility, high performance, strong political 
backing, and attractive financing. 
When discussing future Middle Eastern contracts, especially 
with oil and gas suppliers, it is important to note that 
winning the UAE nuclear deal, even with a very small profit 
margin, proved profitable for South Korea in the long 
term when considering the multiple contracts other South 
Korean companies won as a direct or indirect result of the 
main agreement. Trade between the two countries grew 24 
percent to $22 billion in 2011, with UAE exports to Korea 
rising by 21.2 percent in 2011 and Korean exports to the UAE 
growing by 32.4 percent.48 Another benefit the ROK secured 
as a result of the nuclear deal is a more stable supply of oil 
and gas. For example, the two countries agreed to store six 
million barrels of oil from Abu Dhabi in Korea and to enable 
Korea to use it in emergency situations. South Korea was 
also able to significantly increase (from 5 to 15 percent) 
of the ratio of its oil and gas imports secured through 
development and production by Korean firms.49 It is easy to 
envision similar benefits from other Middle Eastern gas and 
oil producers in the event that South Korea wins nuclear bids 
in these countries. 
Recommendations 
First, reaching agreement on a long-term nuclear cooperation 
agreement with the U.S. is crucial for future ROK nuclear 
exports. Seoul should use the two-year grace period granted 
by the extension to carefully weigh its strategic interests. Any 
uncertainty in the future and potential for delay related to the 
status of the 123 agreement would undoubtedly be a major 
source of concern for future costumers. On the other hand, 
focusing on particular technologies such as enrichment or 
pyroprocessing should be seen as less important than finding a 
“win-win” solution where the two countries can work together 
to address Seoul’s core concerns: short-and medium-term 
storage for spent fuel, sufficient fuel supplies for South Korea’s 
nuclear fleet, and enhancing South Korea’s nuclear export 
potential. In particular, the ROK and U.S. should continue to 
build on recent initial discussions on how the U.S. can support 
future ROK nuclear exports.50 
Second, instead of emphasizing enrichment and pyroprocessing 
as attractive options for future customers, South Korea should 
strengthen its competitive advantages. South Korea will be better 
off expanding into using nuclear energy for desalination, as well 
as offering training and maintaining qualified and experience 
engineers, managers, technicians and sales specialists. It could 
invest in the construction of additional centrifuge capacity at 
existing enrichment plants in return for guaranteed output. 
Third, to minimize Korean reliance on the U.S., the ROK should 
consider promoting Small Modular Reactors and KAERI’s 
“SMART” small nuclear reactor for export to small countries: 
smaller reactors that are cheaper, easier to manage and more 
adaptable to weak transmission networks and, therefore, better 
address the needs of many newer nuclear clients. For example, 
the SMART reactor design is not based on American technology, 
and it was certified by the Korea Institute for Nuclear Safety 
(KINS) in July 2012.51 This reactor would allow countries with a 
limited electricity network to access nuclear energy and could be 
particularly attractive to some countries in the Middle East due 
to its advantages in thermal heating, desalination, and lack of 
U.S.-origin technology. 
Fourth, Korea should concentrate on counties that can afford 
nuclear energy, especially those in the Middle East that can 
provide the ROK with greater energy security. So far, South 
Korea has been targeting emerging economies that have limited 
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financing capacity, and that have made supplier-provided project 
financing a key criterion; however, a more viable scheme for 
Korea would be to offer financing through export-import banks. 
In the long run, a market reform of domestic electricity tariffs 
in the ROK (that is ending substantial domestic subsidies to 
industry)52 would be helpful to support KEPCO’s financial capacity 
for overseas tenders and permit it to offer to take equity shares 
in future nuclear export tenders and thus reinforce the financial 
position of the Korean consortium. 
Last, while it is so far unclear whether the safety scandals 
South Korea experienced last year will hamper its efforts to sell 
nuclear technology globally, quick and decisive action will be 
important to ensure that it does not damage the ROK’s image 
as a leading nation in nuclear quality and safety. 
Should Seoul follow these recommendations, South Korea has 
the opportunity to make its nuclear reactor exports to the UAE 
the first of many.
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